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Abstract
H. G. Wells’ writings from the first few years of the twentieth century
inherit a discourse on literature and science that can be traced back
to the Victorian debate between Thomas Henry Huxley and Matthew
Arnold. The legacy of this dispute that permeates Wells’ texts here
under investigation lies in the biological metaphors that are deployed
to imagine the human as a partaker of humanity in general. The
scientific education propagated by Wells crucially engages with the
language of the beautiful, the politics of civilisation projects, and
the role of fictional and non-fictional texts as devices of social action.
Recognising the strong sense in these texts that they could serve
as tools for the formation of humanity as the prime agent of science,
this article seeks to examine ‘humanity’ as a term denoting both the
audience for and the achievement of the public intellectual’s
prophetic vision for the future.
Keywords: H. G. Wells, Matthew Arnold, Thomas Henry Huxley,
science and culture, science fiction, politics, humanity
One of the scenes that left a strong mark on our present-day
conception of the relationship between literature and science is the
nineteenth-century debate between the Victorian arch-defender of
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culture Matthew Arnold and the relentless propagator of evolutionary
theory Thomas Henry Huxley.1 Although the duo has often functioned
as the embodiment of the clash between the humanities and the
natural sciences, scholars have pointed out that both men were trying
to reform the same Victorian educational system in light of a changing
social configuration and that their efforts to do so cannot simply be
understood as reciprocally antagonistic. For instance, Paul White has
rightly stressed how the two men were members of ‘a community
of learned e´lites’ constituted by the idea of a shared ‘national culture’
of which science and literature could be regarded as just two forms.
They were part of a group of reformers, liberal Anglicans, ‘bound by
ties of friendship, club life, [. . .] school affiliation, and sometimes by
family relation’ (116).2 After Huxley delivered his famous ‘Science and
Culture’ speech, he received a courteous letter from Matthew Arnold
thanking him for the kindness of his address and even lamenting the
prospect of ‘enter[ing] in controversy with you’. Arnold’s concern was,
so he said in the letter, to emphasise ‘that the dictum about knowing
“the best that has been known and said in the world”’, which was
targeted by Huxley as a denial of the role science could play in
education, ‘was meant to include knowing what has been done in
science and art as well as in letters’.3 This point is repeated in Arnold’s
response to Huxley, the Rede Lecture at Cambridge called ‘Literature
and Science’, delivered almost two years after ‘Science and Culture’. It
suggests that White and others are correct in their estimate that the
difference between the two programmes was one of means and not of
goals. I will start out by arguing that, indeed, there is a crucial
convergence when it comes to the duty of the state educational system
to establish a democratic citizenry through acculturation, but this does
not mean that Arnold was simply agreeing with Huxley. To document
the legacy of the difference that remains, I then turn to H. G. Wells, a
writer with a strong allegiance to Huxley’s thought who nonetheless,
perhaps unwittingly, appeals to the power of the aesthetic in a way that
is much more indebted to Arnold than it is to Huxley.
Huxley and Arnold on Science, Literature, and Culture
In his address in Birmingham, Huxley agreed with Arnold that
‘a criticism of life is the essence of culture’ but not that literature was
sufficient ‘for the construction of such a criticism’ (9).4 If the proponents
of classical education claimed to inherit classical culture, this would
be under false pretences unless they acknowledged ‘that the free
deployment of reason, in accordance with scientific method, is the
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sole method of reaching truth’ (17). The ‘dead civilizations of Greece
and Rome’ might be limited in their knowledge of the natural world,
but their principles are fully compatible with the need for a scientific
method in the development of a criticism of life. For a very long time
in human history, ‘there was no other example of perfect intellectual
freedom – of the unhesitating acceptance of reason as the sole guide
to truth and the supreme arbiter of conduct’ (13). To Huxley, his
adversaries among the Humanists who ‘favour us with allocutions
upon the sadness of the antagonism of science to their mediaeval way
of thinking’ all too often betray an ‘ignorance of the first principles
of scientific investigation [. . .] and an unconsciousness of the weight
of established scientific truths, which is almost comical’ (16).
The notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by
our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is
not the chief body in the material universe, and that the world is not
subordinated to man’s use. It is even more certain that nature is the
expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes, and that the
chief business of mankind is to learn that order and govern accordingly.
[A scientific criticism of life] appeals not to authority, nor to what
anybody may have thought or said, but to nature. It admits that all our
interpretations of natural fact are more or less imperfect and symbolic,
and bids the learner seek for truth not among words but among things. It
warns us that the assertion which outstrips evidence is not only a blunder
but a crime. (15)
The exacerbation of blunder into crime is significant: it prefigures the
ideological implications of Huxley’s epistemological regime spelled
out in more detail towards the end of his speech, where he advocates
that ‘both the capitalist and the operative’, who in the college at
Birmingham would come to ‘sojourn together for a while’, ‘must learn
that social phenomena are as much the expression of natural laws
as any others; that no social arrangements can be permanent unless
they harmonise with the requirements of social statics and dynamics;
and that, in the nature of things, there is an arbiter whose decisions
execute themselves’ (22). This plea for the introduction of ‘the
teaching of Sociology’ stems from the recognition that in the form of
government of ‘universal suffrage, every man who does his duty must
exercise political functions’ (23). If ‘the steady march of self-restraining
freedom’ is to be established, ‘it will be because men will gradually
bring themselves to deal with political, as they now deal with scientific
questions’. The scientific approach delivers the promise that it will
remedy ‘partisan prejudice’ and the all too familiar flaws of human
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organisation through the science of sociology, whose prerogative it is
to caution that ‘the machinery of society is at least as delicate as that of a
spinning-jenny, and as little likely to be improved by the meddling of
those who have not taken the trouble to master the principles of its
action’. Wolfgang Lepenies has compellingly demonstrated that the
agitated ‘struggle’ between science and the humanities in the last two
centuries in France, Germany, and England often takes shape as
a struggle between a scientific approach to social questions (sociology)
and literature or literary criticism as the medium of expression felt
necessary for these issues. In fact, Lepenies makes the case that Arnold’s
response to Huxley can only be properly understood by acknowledging
that ‘Arnold had to defend literature not so much against the natural
sciences as against the rising science of sociology’ (168) and thus, the
biggest threat coming from Darwin’s bulldog lay in these final
sections of the ‘Science and Culture’ speech.5
Arnold’s response in ‘Literature and Science’ confirms that what
is at stake is not the power of natural science but rather its
poverty: its inability to properly account for what humans also care
about – ‘conduct’ and ‘beauty’.6 The real challenge of modern
science for culture is the reconfiguration of a new balance between
epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics that grants a specifically emotional
stability. If knowledge is left to speak for itself as Huxley seemed to
propose, then we would find affective equilibrium in, for example,
‘Mr. Darwin’s famous proposition that “our ancestor was a hairy
quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in
its habits”’ (64). As it stands, however, the discoveries of modern
science are ‘knowledge not put for us into relation with our sense of
conduct, our sense for beauty, and touched with emotion by being so
put; not thus put for us, and therefore, to the majority of mankind,
after a certain while, unsatisfying, wearying’ (65). The feeling of
dissatisfaction is experienced by ‘the majority of mankind’ because it is
an instantiation of a fundamental desire ‘in men that good should be
for ever present to them’ and Arnold supposes – though it remains not
more than a supposition – that this desire ‘acts in us when we feel the
impulse for relating our knowledge to our sense of conduct and our
sense of beauty’ (63):
At any rate, with men in general the instinct exists. Such is human
nature. And the instinct, it will be admitted, is innocent, and human
nature is preserved by our following the lead of its innocent instincts.
Therefore, in seeking to gratify this instinct in question, we are following
the instinct of self-preservation in humanity. (63)
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The old perception of nature might have disappeared, ‘but the
emotions themselves, and their claim to be engaged and satisfied, will
remain’ (67) and ‘it is not on any weak pleadings of my own that I rely
for convincing the gainsayers; it is on the constitution of human nature
itself, and on the instinct of self-preservation in humanity’ (70).
For Huxley, the recognition of the symbolic and its referential
limits was the reason for refuting the authority of words in favour
of ‘things’ considered as ‘evidence’: truth can and must speak for
itself because its content equals its expressive and therefore political
possibility. For Arnold, to consider truth means separating its
denominative from its rhetorical ability. Truth possesses the power to
generate truth content but it has to borrow its meaning from a force
outside its own prerogative. The force of truth itself is powerful,
but nevertheless mediated by ethical and aesthetic considerations
that come to light through a bare empirical realisation that ‘for us’ it is
simply not enough. For people like Charles Darwin, so Arnold argued,
these concerns might not apply, since he was an example of ‘a born
naturalist’, someone who individually ‘has little time or inclination
for thinking about getting [natural knowledge] related to the desire
in man for conduct, the desire in man for beauty’ (65). Here, a
disconnect between both men becomes discernible that revolves
around the concept of humanity, of ‘men in general’. Huxley builds on
an initial integration of culture as a theory of life, something that is
always already participation and does not require a further rite
of passage left to be achieved by an ethical or aesthetic negotiation
that answers a demand coming from an emotionally unresponsive
public – that is, ‘us’. Science is a discourse through which the human
species and humanity become virtually interchangeable concepts and
culture is just another name for the collectively engaged practice
of making sense of the world as human animals just happen to do.
Conversely, Arnoldian culture is the expression of an innocent instinct
that humanity follows in an attempt at self-preservation. It is at
the same time an effect of the fundamental desire ‘in men that
good should be for ever present to them’ (63). Humanity therefore
involves a preliminary orientation phase that ensures a transition of
the good into a presence for humans in general, a presence that,
if established, transitions humans into humanity just as it makes
intellectual content (say, truth) an individual reality – a reality of
feeling that, apathetic Darwins notwithstanding, is characterised by an
appeal to ‘the constitution of human nature itself’ (70). Human nature
is not an index for a biological species and its necessary features, but a
password to access a reality of common feeling that is immutable as
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much as it is participatory. Although left implicit in Arnold’s text, the
production of a public is indispensable to the discourse on life which is
the province of culture, and in the grasp of this difference between
him and Huxley lies the clue for Arnold’s recuperation of, to a degree,
the most unlikely element in the triad: the beautiful.
So far, we have not mentioned how Arnold attempts to ensure a
future for the practice of humane letters if science is insufficient to
establish the relationship with conduct and beauty. This responsibility
should definitely not be left to the professionals: ‘I do not mean that
modern philosophical poets and modern philosophical moralists are
to come and relate for us, in express terms, the results of modern
scientific research to our instinct for conduct, our instinct for beauty’
(68). The classics represent the best humane letters available and, to
counter Huxley’s contention that they are certainly no more or less
preferable than, say, modern literature, Arnold asks himself the
question: ‘have poetry and eloquence the power of calling out
the emotions? The appeal is to experience. Experience shows that
for the vast majority of men, for mankind in general, they have the
power’ (67). It is as simple as that. Access to experience is granted by
‘the art and poetry and eloquence of men who lived, perhaps, long
ago’ because ‘they have a fortifying, and elevating, and quickening,
and suggestive power, capable of wonderfully helping us to relate
the results of modern science to our need for conduct, our need
for beauty’ (68). Arnold has a few words of comfort for the ‘poor
humanist’ who sits at the receiving end of accusations of irrelevance
and untimeliness: ‘So long as human nature is what it is, their
[humane letters’] attractions will remain irresistible’ (72) and it should
therefore be warranted to entertain ‘a happy faith that the nature of
things works silently on behalf of the studies which he loves, and that
[. . .] the majority of men will always require humane letters; and so
much more, as they have the more and the greater results of science
to relate the need in man for conduct, and the need in him for beauty’
(72–3). These hopeful words provide for Arnold an occasion to
incorporate the language of modern biology into a revaluation effort
of humane letters. By inscribing the need for beauty in human nature,
the authority of words itself is transformed into the appeal to
nature that marked for Huxley the only true way of developing a
scientific criticism of life. The principle of observation is not so much
overturned as it is reinterpreted as a functional equivalent of the reality
of life and nothing else, certainly not a stage on which only truth
is allowed to perform in isolated meaningfulness. The refusal to
acknowledge that common humanity is in need of the emotional
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effectiveness of poetry and eloquence, is to exile the reality of
experience from the province of observation if that observation wants
to have anything to say about culture. That is, if culture has a public.
Anticipations
In 1901, H. G. Wells, who was by then an already reasonably successful
author of the science fiction stories he is still remembered for today,
started the serialised publication in Fortnightly of a tract that marked
the beginning of a new phase in his career. The collection’s full title
was Anticipations: Of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon
Human Life and Thought and contained nine pieces, published over the
course of as many months, describing the major changes English
society was going through and speculating how the civil, economic and
moral state of affairs would and should continue to develop in the
next one hundred years. Although the endeavour was not Wells’
first exposition of a socio-political nature, it was his first sustained,
book-length excursion into the matter and it was the one that made
him a recognised member of the class of public intellectuals, whose
self-appointed task it was to think and rethink social, ethical, and
political modernity in industrialised late-Victorian England.7 In Wells’
oeuvre, this turn to lengthier non-fiction meant first and foremost
a retreat from the horrifying evocations of Martians and post-historic
crustaceans that featured in his earlier nineteenth-century fantasies of
science. Already just after his successful debut in 1895 with The Time
Machine and a year later with The Island of Dr Moreau, Wells felt that,
certainly, he had struck a responsive chord with the reading public,
but his ambitions were not limited to the telling of fancy stories
about mad scientists – never mind the fact that he never completely
stopped doing it. What he was after was serious literary and intellectual
recognition. The former he attempted to achieve right after finishing
Moreau, when he started working on his claim to fame as a true
respectable novelist, something he distinguished sharply from the early
‘scientific romances’. Love and Mr Lewisham was the result of this effort,
but as so many of the texts Wells wrote that do not fit the present-day
definition of science fiction, it is largely forgotten.8 The essays that
comprise Anticipations all seek to supply a more down-to-earth version
of the future than Wells’ fiction in order to highlight the author’s
desire to speak to his readership about the future in another genre
than futuristic narrative. They are based on the principle that if a vision
of the future is to be prescient, it must not only deal with what his
contemporary peers all recognised as the most pressing questions of
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the time, including the fate of the labouring poor, the future of
democracy, and the threat of a war on a wholly different scale than was
ever imagined before. It must also find a way to frame these issues as
part of a larger direction which would allow hypotheses about the
future to be as thoughtful as possible by virtue of extrapolation from
confident historical analysis.
The conspectus of turn-of-the-century English society Anticipations
thus offers as the basis for speculation, is based on the idea that
industrialisation, in Wells’ wording the ‘development of mechanism’
(Anticipations 75), has not only altered the world through the spoils
of technological innovation – most notably the ramifications of new
systems of transportation – but also through the remodification of
labour.9 The labouring poor’s only asset is the vast supply of unskilled
work, pure undirected energy that is now delivered by machinery.
These ‘People of the Abyss’, as they are abrasively called by Wells, will
be entirely superfluous in the coming age when a new class of properly
educated mechanics will come to dominate the labour force. The
education of these men – yes, they are all men – is not limited to their
participation in the institutional entity of the school reorganised as a
job training programme: ‘[The educated engineer] must get a grasp of
that permanent something that lies behind the changing immediate
practice [. . .] they will have to be educated rather than trained after
the fashion of the old craftsman’ (95–6). Far more than the demand
for more and better training of the work force, the transformation of
the mechanical revolution extends to a call for a new consciousness,
for a citizenry to gain insight into the underlying currents beneath the
blueprint. The distinction between education and training follows
the idea that rather than an industrial or political achievement, the
break with the past was the result of ‘that process of vigorous and
fearless criticism which is the reality of science, and of which the
development of mechanism and all that revolution in physical and
social conditions we have been tracing, is merely the vast imposing
material byproduct’ (311). Hence, the subject of class as it occurs in
Wells’ tract should not be mistaken for the pursuit of a radical
socialism, and not only because of Wells’ troubling damnation of the
labouring poor. In the new 1914 edition of Anticipations, Wells added a
footnote to emphasise that if people tended to interpret his work as
heavily engaging with class distinctions (the shift of power from
the capitalist to the engineering class), this was certainly not his
design: ‘my intention at least, was to contrast social forces or elements
that more often than not will be found in conflict in individual
men and individual households, not to contrast classes in the
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community, – much less stratified classes’ (Anticipations 1914: 142).
Moreover, in the new preface for this edition, Wells, wishing to
distance himself even further from some of his readers’ presumption
that class consciousness would be a central feature of his new
republicans, reminded them that ‘the New Republic is not a type
and a class of persons but a power in men’s minds and mankind’ (1914:
xiii; original emphasis). The rise of the new ‘class’ is not conditioned
by the ‘Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens’, a sign of the
‘naturwissenschaftlich treu zu konstatierende[] Umwa¨lzung in den
o¨konomischen Produktionsbedingungen’ (Marx iii. 839), but is an
‘unorganized power [. . .] something transcending persons just
as physical or biological science or mathematics transcends
persons’.10 As ‘an extension of the spirit of science to all human
affairs’ (1914: xii), the ‘unorganized power’ is not a scientific socialism;
it is the ‘extension’ of that spiritual transcendence of the kind that
occurs when one observes scientifically. Therefore, the power that
will finally supplant even democracy is neither a new regime nor
a new class of people in charge – although all of these things
might (or might not) occur – but nothing less than ‘the power of
sanity, the power of the thing that is provably right’ (Anticipations 1902:
231).
In this historical narrative of intellectual development, Wells sees
a revolutionary advancement emerge in Thomas R. Malthus’ Essay on
Population. Malthus impressed on the minds of men an unequivocal
admonition of ‘the fundamental fact that the main mass of the
business of human life centres about reproduction’ (312); this was
deeply at odds with the atavistic naivety of traditional utopians who
dreamt up their prospective societies without sufficient recognition of
the material urgency of population and food supply.11 New thinkers
like Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace realised that the radical insight
of Malthus’ thought was the rediscovery of the truth ‘that all men are
individual and unique, and, through long ranges of comparison,
superior and inferior upon countless scores’ (313–4). The diversity so
often denounced by the ‘“liberalizing” movements’ (313) of the past
century came to be recognised, according to Wells, as the species’
most important weapon against extinction. In the wake of modern
intellectual illumination, the rethinking of the whole of the ethical
scheme, destabilised by truth’s material mandate, becomes a pressing
but as yet unfinished task, and Anticipations announces itself as a part of
this project: ‘this present time is essentially the opening phase of a
period of ethical reconstruction, a reconstruction of which the new
republic will possess the matured result’ (311). The reconfiguration
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is to be done on the grounds of science and truth, starting out from its
bare essentials:
Under scientific analysis the essential facts of life are very clearly shown to
be two – birth and death [. . . .] Procreation is the triumph of the living
being over death; and in the case of man, who adds mind to his body, it is
not only in his child but in the dissemination of his thought, the
expression of his mind in things done and made, that his triumph is to
be found. And the ethical system of these men of the new republic [. . .]
will be shaped primarily to favor the procreation of what is fine and
efficient and beautiful in humanity – beautiful and strong bodies, clear
and powerful minds, and a growing body of knowledge – and to check
the procreation of base and servile types, of fear-driven and cowardly
souls, of all that is mean and ugly and bestial in the souls, bodies, or
habits of men. To do the latter is to do the former; the two things are
inseparable. (322–3)
The triumph of life is, to use the idiom of a later scientific prophet,
man’s survival not only as a string of genes but as the materialisation
of mind into memes.12 The word ‘procreation’ not only refers to the
production of offspring, but far more importantly, it also becomes the
principal process of history itself as a testament to the rise and triumph
of the scientific spirit. This constitutive confusion of nature and history
fuels a language that is easily unmasked as the naturalisation of classic
discourses of power pertaining to gender (‘men’, always with ‘strong
bodies’), empire (‘triumph’), class (‘types’ as a character-driven name
for class), and even race later on in the tract.13 For our purposes, it is
important to emphasise that these disparaging assaults on degenerative
bestiality, the inefficiency of function, and the ugliness of person, are
invoked through the aesthetic awareness of the reader and of the new
republican. When the procreation of reason and truth enters as a
historical movement that favours the beautiful and checks the ugly, it
selectively assumes an eye of the beholder that is already infused with
a kind of judgement that attempts both to refer to individuality in
taste and to a perspicacious unity of assessment within generalised
humanity. Beauty acquires the status of an instrument of judgement in
the forming of opinion of what exactly will become the subject of
the preference of procreation, but it also signals the reliance of the
political promise of objectivity on beauty’s purity of purpose.
In a mostly dry and barren tract, one can find the occasional
passage exerting poetical power for the advocacy of its ideas and it is on
such an occasion that we can see how Wells takes a temporary break
from sociology to address his readers and assure them of the promise
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of the things to come, risking his own metaphors spiralling out of
control and revealing the limitations of science in the exertion of
politics. In one such passage, modern thought is defined by its ability
to distinguish
a spacious scheme of events, opening out – perpetually opening
out – with a quality of final purpose as irresistible to most men’s minds
as it is incomprehensible, opening out with all that inexplicable quality of
design that, for example, some great piece of music, some symphony
of Beethoven’s, conveys. We see future beyond future and past behind
past. It has been like the coming of dawn, at first a colorless dawn, clear
and spacious, before which the mists whirl and fade, and there opens to
our eyes not the narrow passage, the definite end we had imagined,
but the rocky, ill-defined path we follow high amid this limitless prospect
of space and time. At first the dawn is cold – there is, at times, a quality
of terror almost in the cold clearness of the morning twilight – but
insensibly its coldness passes, the sky is touched with fire, and presently,
up out of the day-spring in the east, the sunlight will be pouring. . . . And
these men of the new republic will be going about in the daylight of
things assured. (315–16)
Being severely limited as a human being, the power of the vision of all
things passed and all things to come, which grants an insight that is
able to start ethics anew, almost overwhelms the modern thinker as he
watches over the cold emptiness of deep time. An experience of terror
comes over the judging subject when he is granted the privilege of
the observer who expands his conception of time and sees ‘future
beyond future and past behind past’. Betraying a familiarity with the
discourse of the sublime, it is exactly the comprehending without
overcoming that strengthens the thinker and allows him to develop
a philosophy of his world. Or it would be, if only we could listen to
Beethoven instead of reading books. The final purpose is ‘irresistible’
yet ‘incomprehensible’, moreover; it is ‘inexplicable’ except for the
highly enabling figure of musicality which ensures the aesthetic
immediacy of feeling when access to teleological understanding is most
severely threatened by the breakdown of rational comprehension.
The synaesthesia at the end reinforces the power of an explanation
that turns out to be inexplicable. ‘At first the dawn is cold [. . .] but
insensibly its coldness passes’, and what seemed horrible in a first
instance becomes clear and bright but not without the risk of paradox
and dissolution. Thus strengthened and assured, the men of the new
republic will be ready for the task that is set before them, but only if
they feel the coldness pass without sensing it. The empirical sensation
that inspires science will only go so far; it is beauty and its direct access
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to emotional response which provides the guarantee that the members
of the new class will be able to distinguish who or what is part of the
future, as well as offering solace and assurance in the course of its
unfolding. Just like Arnold felt the need for the integration of human
subjectivity in the generality of humanity by an appeal to human
nature, here too, the reader is assured to be a partaker of the promise
of the future, even though the particular content of the promise might
be very different.
Mankind in the Making
In the sequel to Anticipations, Mankind in the Making (1903), a further
move towards Arnold can be traced. The importance of this work,
specifically designed to expand the work started in the prequel, lies in
its attempt at conducting the kind of sociology that Huxley found still
missing in the new school of science, while strongly relying on the
construction of humanity through the metaphors of nature to morph
seamlessly into the language of beauty. Mankind in the Making, unlike
Anticipations, is strongly preoccupied with the development of the
young child as scene and setting for its general conceptions about
the condition of humans in society. This archetypal becoming of man-
in-the-making is first and foremost characterised by his or her mastery
of language, triggering the mythical self-origination of the human by
the evocation of his or her significant silent other, the animal: ‘Other
creatures may think, may [. . .] come almost indefinably near reason
[. . .] but man alone has in speech the apparatus, the possibility, at any
rate, of being a reasoning and reasonable creature [. . . .] With speech
humanity begins’ (Mankind 121). So not only is the human negatively
defined as the non-animal of reason out loud, he or she is also a
partaker of his or her own speciesque totality in his or her participation
in humanity, or, the other way around, humanity is the natural mark
for humankind’s species-being. In this setup, speech is preferred over
writing, yet Wells’ tracts are first and foremost civilisation projects and
thus invariably in need of devices of multiplication and dispersal
to materially embody their otherwise ethereal message. One of the
ways in which the modern state has figured out the formation of its
(colonial) subject, touted as a process of becoming human, is the
institution of the school. Although Wells’ book offers a set of concrete
reform proposals for the English educational system, the school has
one distinct disadvantage:
We treat the complex, difficult and honourable task of intellectual
development as if it were within the capacity of any earnest but
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muddle-headed young lady, or any half-educated gentleman in orders;
we take that for granted, and we demand in addition from them the
‘formation of character’, moral and ethical training and supervision,
aesthetic guidance, the implanting of a taste for the Best in literature, for
the Best in art, for the finest conduct; we demand the clue to success
in commerce and the seeds of a fine passionate patriotism from these
necessarily very ordinary persons. (179–80)
The school is paralleled to writing in formative ability: ‘It is a new
element correlated with the establishment of a wider political order
and with the use of written speech’ and, as such, not possessed by
‘the savage and the barbarian’ (178). In a reiteration of the animalistic
performance of inability to speak reason, the school triggers the
singular thrust of the individual’s integration into a political subject,
yet if these ‘necessarily very ordinary persons’ have to carry the new
republican’s burden then muddle-headedness prevails after all. But
there is still hope. Just read books: ‘there exists a considerable amount
of well-written literature, true stories and fiction, in which, without any
clumsy insistence upon moral points, fine actions are displayed in their
elementary fineness, and baseness is seen to be base [. . .] Practically
these things are as good as example – they are example’ (184).
In ‘A Speech at Eton’, Arnold also responded to the lack
of significance that might be the result of bad schooling, saying
that classical literature, ‘the best, in literature, has the quality of being
in itself formative, – silently formative; of bringing out its own
significance as we read it’ (‘Eton’ 22).14 Being told, taught, what ‘the
development and sense of the world’ is that the classic masterpiece
offers, is not anywhere near the experience of reading it and allowing
the work to self-construct its meaningfulness, so that we can ‘conceive
it as a whole of which we can trace the sequence, and the sense, and
the connection with ourselves’ (23). Wells does not see the classics as
the self-engendered, civilising promise of education due to their lack
of resonance for ordinary people ‘who know little of history, little
of our language, whose only habitual reading is the newspaper,
the popular novel, and the sixpenny magazine’ (Mankind 373). And so
‘the study of works written in the language of a different period,
crowded with obsolete allusions, and saturated with obsolete ideas and
extinct ways of thinking, is pretentious and unprofitable [. . .] fruitless
and absurd’ (373). Modern literature, in contrast, should be
actively promoted and nurtured by state institutions: ‘the business
of contemporary criticism, the encouragement and support of
contemporary writers, is just as vitally important in the modern state as
the organization of Colleges and Schools’ (342; original emphasis). It is
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more than tempting to notice how a substitution of classic
masterpieces with modern literary narratives renders Arnold’s project
into a blueprint for Wells’ investment in the power of literature to
circumvent practicality in order to deliver in practice. When the poetry
and eloquence of the classics as a relay device is removed from the
Arnoldian promise of literature, Wells’ call for literature to create
harmony between human concerns mirrors that of Huxley’s opponent:
Once this deliberate organization of a central ganglion of interpretation
and presentation began, the development of the brain and nervous
system in the social body would proceed apace. [. . .] The general
innervation of society with books and book distributing agencies
would be followed by the linking up of the now almost isolated mental
worlds of science, art, and political and social activity in a system of
intercommunication and sympathy. . . . (388)
Through the institution of literature, humans can come together
and humanity is formed, but only if cast in biotropes of society qua
organism. The practical possibility of redemption can only be
processed by biological metaphors that evoke a certain inevitability
of time, of the future as the growth of an organism, as something we
are all a part of because we are, it just so happens, living. The
mechanical circulation of books is full-blown organic behaviour; the
artifice of the facilitator is both a sign of this behaviour as procreation
promise for ideas and a necessary condition for it. We are organisms
no matter what we might think of it, it is our ‘incurable reality’ (74);
but ‘[t]o rebel against instinct, to rebel against limitation, to evade, to
trip up, and at last to close with and grapple and conquer the forces
that dominate him, is the fundamental being of man’ (78–9). Fighting
our own naturalness is the natural essence of the human animal,
the animal that circulates his speech through writing. Moreover, the
harmony of the mental worlds reveals Wells’ awareness of the rhetoric
of naturalised inevitability – the not to be resisted desire for conduct,
for beauty, in harmony with truth. Arnold just did not comprehend the
power of modern technology.
First Men in the Moon
The First Men in the Moon is a story about a bankrupt playwright (the
narrator Bedford) who meets a hermit scientist (Cavor) investigating
the possibility of anti-gravity matter. Having discovered this substance
called Cavorite, they make their journey to the moon in a glass sphere
and discover it to be a barren place at night, but by day, full of life,
including mooncows and indeed, moon-men, or Selenites. When they
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eat the moon vegetation, they get intoxicated which results in their
capture by the moon people, who then take them into the moon itself,
a place composed of giant halls and intricate machinery. Through a
misunderstanding, Bedford attacks the Selenites and together with
Cavor, they fight their way back to the surface, which goes surprisingly
well because of their superior physical strength. Not knowing where
their sphere is located, they split up, but when Bedford finds it he
discovers a note tainted with blood, hastily written by Cavor explaining
how he was discovered and is about to get captured or, as Bedford
fears, killed. Bedford returns to earth alone and through an accident
loses his sphere and thus any ability to return to find out what
happened to Cavor. A few months after the adventure, an operative of
a Marconi transmitting device picks up a signal from Cavor who is
apparently treated well and living with the Selenites. Cavor sends
messages to earth about what he learns from Selenite society, including
his report about a meeting with the Grand Lunar, a monstrous super-
brain, eager to learn more about humans on earth. However, once the
Grand Lunar learns from Cavor how and why humans fight wars
with guns, a devastating prospect compared to the weaponry of the
Selenites, the transmissions get filtered. When Cavor, possibly realising
his naivety in being honest to the Grand Lunar, ventures to explain the
secret of making Cavorite, the broadcast is cut short entirely, leaving it
impossible for anyone to replicate the journey because the secret of
Cavorite was lost in the ether.
At first glance, Wells’ story is a simple play with perspectives.
When the highly rational Selenites discover the true cruelty of
mankind, they sever all bonds, even though they are impressed with
the ingenuity of man being able to invent Cavorite, which, considering
the overall technological superiority of the Selenites, is no small feat.
They express a desire to learn from humans, but the interplanetary
encounter of knowledge is prematurely shut down by the prospect of
a devastating War of the Worlds, featuring many of the imperialist
concerns that Wells had already addressed in the 1898 story of that
name. That being said, there is something weird going on in The First
Men in the Moon and it is not just the mooncows. The book consists of
two parts. The first contains the bulk of the narrative: the incredible
journey to the moon, the adventures that transpire there, and the
return of Bedford without any way of getting back to the moon. It ends
like a proper, neat little science fiction story: ‘So the story closes as
finally and completely as a dream [. . .] I do more than half believe
[sometimes] that the whole thing was a dream. . .’ (First Men 170). In
the second part, Bedford returns to his story which he thought was
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finished. The transmissions from Cavor are unexpectedly picked up
by ‘a Dutch electrician’ working with state-of-the-art communication
technology ‘akin to the apparatus used by Mr Tesla in America’
(171).15 David Lake points out that Wells in the manuscript first
wanted to give a detailed account of Selenite society with Bedford and
Cavor both present, but refrained from doing so and just let Bedford
return alone without learning anything more about the moon inside.
‘But then, probably late in 1900, Wells had his inspiration for Part II: to
salvage the deeper view of the moon via radio. He wrote [Part II and]
sent this extra part to the monthly magazines, and the story continued
in them with no hiatus’ (xxii). And so in the story, just like Wells
himself, Bedford, even after he ‘had seen the greater portion of it
appear in The Strand Magazine’ (171), revisits his account to share with
his readers Cavor’s account of Selenite society, promising that
eventually, a full ‘scientific report’ (182) of the transmissions will be
published.16 Cavor’s words overcome the physical limitations that bind
humans to the earth to allow us a glimpse of the sub-lunar world in a
way that initially did not fit a gothic adventure story, figuring the
communicative leap necessary to sociological imagination as scientific
practice. Through a revolutionary new instrument of observation, the
readers of the science fiction story get to learn about moon society and
how they themselves as humans, when subjected to an identical act of
observational scrutiny, turn out to be the alien agents of imperial
violence and destruction that the reader encountered in The War of the
Worlds.
In line with this reading of First Men, Aaron Worth notices how
the fading out of the messages from the moon denotes the
metaphorical overextension of cultural imperialism, noting that
‘technologies of communication are central to the construction of
an imperial chronotope linking colonial expansion with cultural
fragility’ (Worth 77). Wells’ elated embrace in Anticipations and other
non-fiction work of ‘technologically saturated utopias premised upon
the eradication of all difference’ (85) has to reconcile itself, so argues
Worth, with his own scepticism regarding colonial projects, resulting
in a text like First Men, where ‘Englishness (with language serving
as a cultural or racial stand-in) has overextended itself, and flies
broadcast, scattered and distorted, across infinite space, destroying
itself in the process’ (81). Wells, ‘by seeking a technological solution
to an ideological problem’ (85), leaves his chronotopology to express
contradiction and indecision without actually openly engaging
with these ‘ideological fissures’ (86) between (global) humanity
construction and mono-acculturation. Indeed, in Mankind, one
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encounters exactly the kind of imperial project First Men can just
as equally serve as a warning for. To counter the colonial worry of
the bastard forms of proper pronunciation in ‘white-nigger English’
(Mankind 134), Mankind invests technologies such as the ‘phonograph
and telephone’ with the possibility of ‘storing, analysing, transmitting,
and referring to sounds’ to guarantee ‘a good and beautiful
pronunciation of English uniform throughout the world’ (137).
Down the slippery slope of the power of truth, we can see its
convenient absence from pronunciation’s evaluation as a distortion
that barely gets repressed by the limits of objective judgment. No ‘true’
English is available to Wells, yet the appeal of the techno-fantastic
unification of all is too strong not to implicate the rhetoric of
universality as a consequence of truth within the statement. Even
though Worth’s arguments are hitting the mark when it comes to this
central ambiguity within Wells’ project, I wish to examine just a little
further the way in which a text like First Men to a certain extent is
already aware of this and seeks to negotiate itself beyond this
contradiction.
In a final dramatic scene that closes the story, Bedford supplies his
readers with the last message of Cavor to earth coming to us ‘like a cry
in the night that is followed by a stillness’:
‘I was mad to let the Grand Lunar know –’
There was an interval of perhaps a minute. One imagines some
interruption from without. A departure from the instrument – a
dreadful hesitation among the looming masses of apparatus in that
dim, blue-lit cavern – a sudden rush back to it, full of resolve that came
too late. Then, as if it were hastily transmitted, came: ‘Cavorite made as
follows: take –’
There followed one word, a quite unmeaning word as it stands: ‘uless’.
And that is all.
It may be he made a hasty attempt to spell ‘useless’ when his fate
was close upon him [. . . .] I see, almost as plainly as though I had
seen it in actual fact, a blue-lit shadowy dishevelled Cavor struggling
in the grip of these insect Selenites, struggling ever more desperately
[. . .] perhaps even at last fighting and being forced backward step
by step out of all speech or sign of his fellows, for evermore into
the Unknown – into the dark, into that silence that has no end. . . .
(212–13)
The scientist’s voice conveying a sociological discourse and critique is
shut out of circulation by a force all too human because it is inspired by
an instinct of self-preservation, and, at the same time, radically alien in
its inability to maintain communication even when it employs the
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universal discourse of objective truth. With the fate of the secret of
Cavorite, which allowed the imagination to leap into space only to find
a confrontation with humanity’s own cruelty on earth, First Men puts on
display the fear not only of the impossibility of interspecific contact
unharmed by imperialism, but of its own ineptitude as cautionary
tale. The text marks its own uselessness by an ‘unmeaning word’,
‘uless’ – an anticipatory echo that Mankind’s promise of the
interconnectedness of all, might be without you, the addressee, the
reader. You-less. Cavorite figures as the performance of the warning
itself, equating the uselessness of science with the uselessness of fiction.
To not take heed of the message is to expel its content out of the
realm of humanity, ‘out of all speech or sign of [Cavor’s] fellows’
disappearing like ‘a cry in the night’, ‘into the dark, into that silence
that has no end’. This stark ending does not, however, fully foreclose
the civilising project. The undelivered message collapses into an
observable silence, a surface noise coming from the apparatus itself
that allows raw technology to enunciate the warning of what happens
when the artist is not able to relay the scientist’s knowledge by an
inability of humanity to overcome nature and to rise above it, or, what
happens if the forces of prejudice and fear (even if justified) prevail
over the desire to advance knowledge and truth in alien exchange.
Humanity itself, including its imperial determination, is not forced to
face its own alien face of violence and control; it just needs to learn
from the example that is First Men, itself the technological instrument
of fiction.
Yet, while humanity listens to the dark ether of outer space,
a possibility offered by revolutionary communication technology
of Marconi-devices and widely distributed science fiction books, its
existence itself as a (to be) cautioned observer remains dependent on
the text it so desperately needs for establishing an alternative political
reality. The last few words at the very end of the story, ‘into that silence
that has no end’, did not appear as such in the American serialisation
in Cosmopolitan. There it says: ‘into the dark, into a living death’
(229).17 Life in its cultural and biological sense, harmoniously
interwoven in Huxley’s discourse as shown above, is enunciated and
redacted in a paradox of the living dead – zombie-being as a condition
of unreceptivity yet bare existence. Whereas the Strand version refuses
to let go of humanity as the proper receptacle for its warning,
in Cosmopolitan, the fate of the message itself is not that of it being
unheard, but it disappearing into an entity that is not even really
living – ‘into a living death’. Even though humans might still live and
breathe, the failure of science to rescue humanity from war and
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devastation is equalled to the impossibility of participation itself, an
exile to the life that is not bio-tropologically living because the rise of
humans into humanity is unavailable. Science is prevented from
speaking and transmuting its content without a consideration for the
good, without a consideration for the ramifications of humans going
to the moon. As such, the loss of the scientific message is just as
much a salvation of Selenites and humans, as it is the collapse of the
latter into a living death because nobody is listening. The breakdown
of communication and even of humanity itself is not an imperial
overextension, it is a blessing, but one that is achieved by an
investment into the tension of narrative, the dramatic ending of a
science fiction story in which one of its protagonists is literally forced
out of the written text just as it ends.
The Cosmopolitan text foregrounds a crisis of deliverance, not only
in terms of editorial materiality – what copy-text is the real, proper
warning? – but also by its exclusion of life as a reading life, a life of
receptivity the Strand Magazine text and later versions wish to retain. In
the silence, voices can be distinguished if they are (at all) used, not so
if their audience turns out to be the walking dead, humans without
humanity. First Men, aside from trying to think the different,
contradictory thoughts of globalised humanity, is a text about
textuality itself in the sense that its haunting awareness of public
resonance as precondition for and result of its own message highlights
as much the limits of science as the limits of literature in the face of
indifference. Worth’s analysis is pertinent, but we have to consider also
that First Men offers an ideological solution to a technological problem:
the text’s technological inability to be a unifying communication
device is transformed into an ideology of warning that constructs
humanity and all its ramifications as the only possible audience to
avert the danger it forewarns. The Cosmopolitan ending exposes this
tactic by offering salvation without humanity that then later had to
be replaced by endless silence in an attempt to ward off this
consequence by establishing the independent observer’s experience
of background noise as its silent alternative. Wells, throughout
the remaining 40 years of his career, would try to fight for a political
humanity of the future as the utopian constitution of an entity that
would be able to communicate with alien civilisations on the moon,
but in this text, the repressed counter to that project shows the
awkward countenance of a thinking that relies so strongly on its own
technological circulation that the instability of the text as a single
document becomes hard to bear if, as a proper example, it needs a
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1. For a historical and bibliographical entry point into the debate, see Roos.
2. As White mentions, this last requirement was met in the case of Huxley and Arnold.
Julia, Arnold’s niece, married Huxley’s eldest son, Leonard.
3. Matthew Arnold to Thomas Henry Huxley, 17 October 1880. Emphasis in the
original. Taken from the digital edition of The Letters of Matthew Arnold by the
University of Virginia Press: http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/arnold/
display.xqy?letter=V5P116D2
4. The speech was delivered at the opening of the Josiah Mason College in
Birmingham on 1 October 1880.
5. For a more detailed treatment of Arnold’s view on modern literature, see de Graef.
6. Arnold’s Rede Lecture at Cambridge, ‘Literature and Science’, was first delivered
on 14 June 1882.
7. The publication of Anticipations triggered the interest of Beatrice Webb, who would
invite Wells to the Co-Efficients discussion group and later on the Fabian Society.
For a brief, recent account of this episode in British socialist circles see Levitas, esp.
531.
8. For a short presentation of some bibliographical material regarding the inception
of Lewisham, see Loing.
9. Page numbers in the text refer to the 1902 edition of Anticipations. Only if explicitly
mentioned, the 1914 edition is used.
10. Karl Marx’s famous phrasing in the Vorwort to Zur Kritik der Politischen O¨konomie.
11. The produce of the earth ‘may increase for ever, and be greater than any
assignable quantity; yet still the power of population being in every period so much
superior, the increase of human species can only be kept down to the level of the
means of subsistence by the constant operation of the strong law of necessity acting
as a check upon the greater power’ (Malthus i. 15).
12. See Richard Dawkins’ eleventh Chapter of The Selfish Gene (1976) entitled ‘Memes:
The New Replicators’.
13. ‘And for the rest, those swarms of black, and brown, and dirty-white, and yellow
people, who do not come into the new needs of efficiency? Well, the world is a
world, not a charitable institution, and I take it they will have to go. The whole
tenor and meaning of the world, as I see it, is that they have to go. So far as they
fail to develop sane, vigorous, and distinctive personalities for the great world
of the future, it is their portion to die out and disappear’ (Anticipations 341).
Any extensive treatment of a text like Anticipations needs to address passages such
as these. It is my failure to bring them to the reader only in this footnote and
without proper comment. Some commentators (cf. Vlitos 28) have made
provisional attempts to address these controversial moments as breaches of our
‘modern conceptions of political acceptability’ (Partington 59); either in terms
of some misunderstood ironic play from Wells (McLean 141–2) or by trying to
emphasise the progressive nature of Wells’ political thought when seen against the
backdrop of its own historical context (Partington 51–61). I think these attempts
are insufficient because they do not fully engage with the ideological investment
that utopian projects depend on when they generate their own vilified others.
14. The address was delivered to the Eton Literary Society on 5 April 1879.
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15. Nikola Tesla himself was no stranger to the fantasy of global interconnectedness
facilitated by technology. I wish to thank Tom Toremans for pointing this out to
me.
16. Strand Magazine serialised First Men in Britain; at the same time, it appeared in
America in Cosmopolitan (cf. infra). David Lake finds the Cosmopolitan text to be ‘the
shortest and most “primitive”’ (First Men xxviii) of the four versions in circulation
in 1901, seeing that Wells did not read proofs for Cosmopolitan, but he did so for
Strand.
17. The source is here provided by David Lake’s Explanatory Notes in First Men.
Worth ignores these different versions as he describes (without referring to the
Cosmopolitan version) the end of Cavor’s messages to earth as ‘a radio silence that
figures death’ (Worth 81).
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